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A Comparison of the Drawee's Rights
on Altered Instruments Under
the Common Law, NIL and UCC
WILLIAM

0.

MORRIS*

Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act,
hereafter referred to as the NIL, courts in the various jurisdictions in
the United States consistently held that the doctrine of the case of
Price v. Neal' should not be extended to cover checks which had
been altered after execution and prior to payment by the drawee
bank. That well known case, decided over two centuries ago, was
concerned with the issue of whether the drawee which had paid
two instruments, one having been previously accepted, might recover
back from the party who had received payment on the bills upon
discovering that the drawer's signature on the instruments had been
forged. The English court refused to permit recovery back by the
drawee-payor the sum paid on these forged instruments. This case
is frequently cited as authority for the proposition that the drawee
who has paid a good faith purchaser of a bill on which the drawer's
signature had been forged is not entitled to recover back from the
recipient of payment the sum paid on a forged bill. While there
might well have been, and probably was, a mutual mistake of fact
in paying and receiving payment on the forged bills, the drawee
was nevertheless charged with the responsibility of recognizing the
forgery of the drawer's signature at the time the drawee accepted
or paid the instrument. The drawee having admitted by paying or
accepting the instrument the genuineness of the drawer's signature
at the time of accepting or paying the bill such drawee is thereafter
estopped from raising the issue of the lack of genuineness of the
drawer's signature against one who received payment in good faith
and had acquired the instrument for value.
If the drawee is estopped after paying or accepting a bill from
questioning the genuineness of the drawer's signature, should he likewise be estopped from subsequently raising the issue of whether
the instrument had been altered after execution such as by changing
the name of the payee or raising the amount of the instrument? The
*
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common law, as it will subsequently be developed, permitted the
drawee who had paid an altered instrument to recover back the
money paid from the party with whom the drawee had dealt on
the theory of money paid under mistake of fact.
In one sense an altered bill is a forged bill for clearly the altered
instrument is not the drawer's order, for the drawer gave one order
and the instrument purports to carry another order. However, prior
to the adoption of the NIL the courts applied the doctrine of money
paid under mistake of fact in order to permit the drawee-payor
to recover back the money improperly paid on an altered bill when
the drawee had not been negligent in making payment, while
denying the drawee the same right when the drawer's signature had
been forged.
MEASURE OF RECOVERY

It is elementary that the drawee may only debit the account of
the drawer when the drawee paid in strict compliance with the
order given by the drawer. If after execution of the bill the name
of the payee is changed the drawee upon payment of the bill may
not debit the account of the drawer for the drawee had not paid the
instrument in accordance with the drawer's order. In this instance
the drawee-payor may recover back the entire amount paid on the
instrument from the person to whom payment was made.
Where the alteration is only to the amount of the bill the drawee
might debit the account of the drawer according to the original tenor
of the bill or check. The only portion of the payment which was
paid under mistake of fact was the excess over the amount of the
original tenor of the bill or check and the drawee would be limited
to recovering only this amount from the one to whom payment was
made.
In instances where the
and amount the drawee
with the drawer's order,
back the entire sum paid

bill or check was altered as to both payee
not having paid anything in accordance
if entitled to any recovery, could recover
from the recipient of payment.
COMMON LAW

In the leading case of Espy v. First Natl Bank' the S. & M.
depositors in the First National Bank made a check payable to the
285

U. S. (18 Wall.) 947 (1873).
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order of E. Hart in the amount of $26.50. A stranger to the instrument erased the name of the payee and the amount and inserted
as the payee the name of Espy, Heidelback & Co. and the amount of
$3,920 dollars and passed it for value to the named payee. Shortly
after the drawee paid the check the alterations were discovered and
the drawee demanded a return of the sum paid. Justice Miller
speaking for the court said: "The principle that money so paid
under a mistake of fact of the case can be recovered back is well
settled, and in the case of raised or altered checks so paid by banks
in which they were drawn. There are numerous well-settled cases
where the right to recover has been established, when neither party
receiving nor the party paying has been in any fault or blame in the
matter."'
One might consider whether the drawee should be put on notice
of the fact that a check had been altered merely because the handwriting in the body of the check is different from that of the drawer's
signature. The California court4 in an action to determine upon
whom the loss should fall in respect to a check which had been altered
as to date, name of the payee and amount indicated in dicta that
the drawee bank which cashed the check in good faith and without
negligence could recover from the party receiving payment the amount
over and above the original tenor of the instrument on the theory
of money paid under mistake of fact. The fact that the body of
the instrument was in a different handwriting than the signature
of the drawer would not in law or in the ordinary course of business
cause one paying the instrument to be suspicious since checks are
often filled in by persons other than the party signing.
Two years after the decision in the California case, the Missouri
court in the case of Third Nat'l Bank v. Allen' involved a check
which had been altered as to amount and as to the payee prior to
payment by the drawee bank. The Missouri court permitted the
drawee bank to recover back the amount paid by the drawee bank.
As the plaintiff had in no way contributed to the mistake the plaintiff
was permitted to recover back the money paid under mistake of
fact. The recovery returned the parties to the position held by each
prior to the operation of the mistake. Just months after the Third
3Id. at 949.
4 Bedington

5

v. Woods, 45 Cal. 406 (1873).
59 Mo. 310 (1875).
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National Bank case was decided the New York court reached the
same result in White v. Continental Nat'l Bank.'
Shortly thereafter the Texas court in City Bank v. First Nat'l
Bank' permitted the drawee that had paid a check which had been
altered as to amount to recover from the party with whom the
bank had dealt the difference between the original tenor of the
check and the sum paid. Again the decision was based on the
theory of money being paid under mistake of fact. The court indicated that the bank would be entitled to the recovery even if the
paying bank had been negligent in making payment so long as the
recipient of the payment was not damaged by that negligence.
What is the effect of an indorsement so far as establishing liability?
Prior to the adoption of the NIL some few courts permitted the
drawee bank which had paid a check to recover from an indorser,
who endorsed subsequent to the alteration, for breach of warranty.
In FarmersBank v. Bank of Abbeville,8 decided a year prior to the
adoption of the NIL by the Georgia legislature, the court in its
syllabus to the case stated: "Every transferee of a negotiable instrument, warrants (unless otherwise agreed by the parties) that he is
the lawful holder and has a right to sell, that the instrument is genuine, and that he has no knowledge of any fact which proves the
instrument to be worthless, either by insolvency of the maker,
payment, or otherwise." 9 In this opinion, which leaves something
to be desired, the court, without giving any consideration to whom
the warranties extended, stated simply: "It [the drawee] had the
right to proceed upon the indorsement; and this right could not
be defeated upon the ground that it might have proceeded against
the drawer.'"
In the prior considered City Bank case1" the Texas court permitted the drawee to recover back the difference between the
original and altered tenor of the check on the theory that the
defendant's indorsement thereon was a representation and warranty
that "The indorsement . . .by the defendant amounts to a repre-

sentation and warranty that it was genuine.'" 2
N.Y. 316 (1876).
Tex. 203 (1876).
8 29 Ga. App. 472, 116 S.E. 204 (1923).
9Id.at 472, 116 S.E. at 205.
'1ld.at 475, 116 S.E. at 206.
,145 Tex. 203 (1876).
12 Id. at 217.
664
7 45
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The plaintiff might well rely on this responsibility of defendant,
and make payment when demanded, secure in being reimbursed if
the amount of check should prove to have been raised.
The language used by the New York Court in White v. Continental
Nat'l Bank" is most interesting. In that case the court reversed the
decision of the lower court which had found for the defendant in
which the drawee had sought to recover back the sum paid on an
altered check. The court summarized the applicable principles in
the following concise language: "The plaintiffs, as drawees of the
bill, were only held to a knowledge of the signature of their
correspondents, the drawers; by accepting and paying the bill they
only vouched for the genuineness of such signatures, and were not
held to a knowledge of the want of genuineness of any other part
of the instrument, or of any other names appearing thereon, or of
the title of the holder."1 4 Judge Allen speaking for the court continued by starting: "The defendant a holder of the bill and claiming
to be entitled to receive the amount thereof from the drawees, was
held to a knowledge of its own title and the genuiness of the indorsements, and of every part of the bill other than the signature of the
drawers, within the general principle which makes every party to
a promissory note or bill of exchange a guarantor of the genuineness
of every preceding indorsement, and of the genuineness of the
instrument."'" The court in effect stated that the presentation of the
check for payment and the receipt of payment by the defendant
was equivalent to an indorsement by the defendant and he should
be held liable accordingly.
While in Redington v. Woods the California 6 court denied the
drawee the right to recover any sum paid on an altered check because
the drawee had failed to return or offer to return the altered check
to the defendant, the court by way of dicta stated: "But in view
of another trial, it may be proper to notice the proposition urged by
plaintiff, to the effect that by indorsing the check the defendants
guaranteed that it was genuine in respect to the amount appearing
on its face."'" In respect to the effect of the indorsement of the
recipient of payment the court stated that the indorsement "implies,
at best, only an undertaking that he has a valid title to the bill or
13
14

64 N.W. 316 (1876).
Id. at 318.

15ibid.
16 45 Cal. 406 (1873).
17 Id. at 428.
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check, and consequently, a right to receive payment-an implication
which the law raises without the indorsement. But the indorsement,
proprio vigore, imposes upon him no other or greater liability to
refund money paid upon an altered check than would attach to him
8
without the indorsement."'
DUTY AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF DRAWEE UPON

DIsCOVERING ALTERATION
What is the responsibility of the drawee in respect to diligence in
discovering and giving timely notice that the instrument which it had
paid had been altered?
The English jurist, Justice Mathews, in setting forth the view
of the English courts in respect to the drawee's duty to promptly
discover and act in regard to altered bills which the drawee had paid
stated: "If the mistake is discovered at once, it may be the money
can be recovered back; but if it be not, and the money is paid in
good faith, and is received in good faith, and there is an interval
of time in which the position of the holder may be altered, the
principle seems to apply that money once paid cannot be recovered
back. The rule is obviously, as it seems to me, indispensable for the
conduct of business." 1 9
An American court as early as 1840 had in the Louisiana case of
Merchants'Bank v. Exchange Bank2" concerned itself with the question of diligence on the part of the drawee in discovering the alteration of a bill. This case involved a check which had been altered
in amount from $213.50 to $5,013.50, then indorsed and subsequently paid by the plaintiff. The plaintiff learned of the alteration
on July 17, 1837 and informed the defendants of the alteration on
August 2, 1837. The defendant unsuccessfully pleaded that the
plaintiff had been guilty of laches in failing to give the defendant
timely notice of the discovered alteration.
Later the Missouri appellate court was concerned with the almost
identical issue which had concerned the Louisiana court in the
Merchants' Bank case. The Missouri case of Third Nat'l Bank v.
Allen" involved a check which had been altered in amount from
Ibid.
London & River Plate Bank v. Bank of Liverpool, 1 Q.B.D. 7, 11
(1896).
2016 La. 457 (1840).
21 Third Nat'l Bank v.Allen, 59 Mo.310 (1875).
18

'"
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$20.00 to $36.38 prior to payment by the drawee-plaintiff. The
plaintiff discovered the alteration the day after it had paid the check
and, according to the plaintiff's testimony, the same day notified the
defendant. The court in considering the length of time allowed to
the drawee to give notice said: ". . . one who pays money on
forged paper . . .by cashing it, can always recover it back . . .
[if he] has given sufficient early notice of the mistake to the other
after he had discovered it . . . In the early English cases it was
strictly held that the payor could not recover the money unless he
gave notice on the very day of the payment and before any change
of circumstances." 22 The court continued by stating: "The American
courts have mostly repudiated it, and the accepted rule is that the
payor must be allowed a reasonable time to detect the forgery and
demand restitution .... Therefore where no negligence is imputable
to the drawee in failing to detect the forgery, want of notice within
the time what ordinarily charges previous parties on negotiable paper
is excused, provided it be given to the holder as soon as the forgery
is discovered."2
The New York court in White v. Continental Nat'l Bank24 stated
the right of the drawee who had paid an altered instrument to have
recovery back is unquestionable "unless their right is barred by some
circumstance which takes the case out of the general rule, or by
some act of their own they have lost the right."25 Here there was
not such a change in position on the part of the defendant to create
an estoppel against the plaintiff in his effort to recover against the
defendant. The New York Court expressed its view through the
following statement: "It is now settled both in England and in this
state that money paid under a mistake of fact may be recovered
back, however negligent the party paying may have been in making
the mistake, unless the payment has caused such a change in the
position of the other party that it would be unjust to require him
to refund .. .26
The same conclusion was reached by the Texas court in City Bank
v. First Nat'l Bank." The Texas court stated the law as follows:
"The modem doctrine is believed to be that, as against one who
22
Id.at
23

313.
Ibid.
2464 N.Y. 316 (1876).
25
at 318.
26 Id.
National Bank of Commerce v. National Mechanics' Ass'n., 55 N.Y. 213,
216 (1873).
27 45 Tex. 203 (1876).
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passes a raised bill or check, and especially in form of a drawee
who pays to such a party on the faith of his indorsement, and in so
doing violated no obligation or duty, reasonable diligence is all that
can be required, and where that is exercised, and no damage has
resulted from the delay, the right to recover is not lost."28 The
plaintiff was allowed recovery.
As evidenced by Redington v. Woods"' the drawee must return
or offer to return the altered check to the defendant as a condition
precedent to any right of recovery since the law will presume actual
or potential damage from the plaintiff's failure to return the check.
The defendant would need the instrument to proceed against prior
persons liable on the instrument, the court reasoned.30
RIGHTS OF DRAWEE AS AGAINST COLLECTING BANK

The question of the right of the drawee bank to recover from the
collecting agent in instances where the drawee paid an altered check
to one who held the instrument under a restrictive indorsement was
the concern of the California court in Crocker-Woolworth Nat'l Bank
v. Nevada Bank.' The Bank of Woodland drew its check upon
the Crocker Bank for twelve dollars to the order of Dean. Dean
altered the check from twelve dollars to 22,000 dollars and indorsed
it with a general indorsement and received "provisional credit" in
the Nevada Bank which sent it through the usual clearing house procedure for collection. The check found its way in regular course
from the clearing house to the Crocker Bank, which was the correspondent of the Woodland Bank (drawer) and had on deposit
funds of the Woodland Bank. After payment had been made to the
Nevada Bank, Dean checked out 20,000 dollars leaving but 2,000
dollars in his account in the Nevada Bank.
The California Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower
court which had been in favor of the plaintiff because of the clearing
house rules which provided that negotiable paper deposited for
clearance by members of the association should bear the stamp of
the depositing bank, which stamp should be, "For clearing house
purposes only," and should guarantee the validity and regularity of
prior indorsements, and that every bank should file with every
28

Id. at 219.

2945
30

Cal. 406 (1873).

See Central Nat'l Bank v. F. W. Drosten Jewelry Co., 203 Mo. App.

646, 220 S.W. 511 (1920).
31

139 Cal. 564, 73 Pac. 456 (1903).
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member a certified impression of its clearing house stamp. Held,
That where a "raised" check payable to an individual and drawn
on a bank was deposited by another bank with the clearing house
indorsed by stamp, "Pay through clearing house," the indorsement
conveyed no representation to the drawee that the depositing bank
claimed itself to be the owner of the paper; and hence, in an action
by the drawee which paid the check to recover from the other bank,
it was permissible for it to show that it had acted merely as a collecting agent for the payee to whom it had paid the money.
The court states: "At and before the time of making payment the
plaintiff had no notice or knowledge whatever that the defendant
was not, as it purported and represented itself to be, the absolute
owner and holder of said check, and no notice or knowledge that
the said check was presented by the defendent as agent for collection
only, or otherwise than as owner and principal." 2 "The value and
importance of this finding to support the judgment arises from the
principle above stated, that if one be, or hold himself out as, the
owner of such paper, then a recovery may be had against him, if it
be reasonably sought, because he will be the holder of money paid,
which in good conscience and equity he should not be allowed to
in the case of an agent, recourse is limited to the
retain; whereas,
33
principal.M
The court also stated: "Still further, an implied warranty of
genuineness accompanies the unrestricted indorsement and transfer
of any negotiable instrument. It is an assurance to the drawee
of its genuineness in all respects, saving that of the name of the
34
drawer alone, with which knowledge of the drawee is charged.
While the court earlier in the opinion had referred to money paid
under mistake of fact, this statement by the court would lead one
to believe that the court based its decision in part on the fact that
the defendant had indorsed the instrument.
Judge Vance in National Park Bank v. Seaboard Bank3" was of
the opinion that if a draft is paid by the drawee under a mistake
of fact, that is, that the defendant either owned it, or simply held
it for collection as an agent, the drawee-payor could obtain restitution
from the one who received payment provided its condition had not
3

2 Id. at

577, 73 Pac. at 460.

Id. at 577, 73 Pac. at 460.
34 Id. at 574, 73 Pac. at 459.
33
35

114 N.Y. 28, 20 N.E. 632 (1889).
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in the meantime changed so that it would be unjust or in case of
agency the agent had not paid the money over to the principal, as
where the one who received payment was not the owner of the
bill but merely presented it for payment as the agent of another.
The agent could not be required to repay if the agent had paid over
to its principal the sum received before receiving notice of the
mistaken payment. The plaintiff in National Park Bank v. Seaboard

Bank36 claimed that the entry, made by the defendant who had
received the bill for collection, on its books to the credit of Eldred
Bank, which had received the check for collection upon receipt of
the draft proved that it belonged to the defendant, while the
defendant claimed that the restrictive indorsement of the draft by
Eldred bank prevented any change of title, and simply evidenced
an agency for collection. As settlement had been made by one
deemed an agent to collect with his principal before the alteration
was discovered, the drawee could not recover back from the
collecting agent any portion of the sum paid. All sums to the credit
of the Eldred Bank at the time of payment had been paid by
defendant to the Eldred Bank before the alteration was discovered.
The defendant was held not liable to plaintiff for the amount thus
erroneously paid to it.
In a subsequent case37 involving this same transaction, but between
the National Park Bank and Eldred Bank, the drawee, National Park
Bank, was permitted to recover from Eldred Bank the sum erroneously paid. The court stated:
"In the case at bar the draft was indorsed absolutely to the
Eldred Bank, and they directed its collection for their own account, thereby assuming the place of principal as far as the
plaintiff was concerned. If they were acting as collecting agents
only, as they now claim, such agency was not disclosed to the
plaintiff at the time of the transaction, and it had the right to
rely upon the responsibility of the defendant, as owner of the
draft, in payment of the same."38
In United States Nat'l Bank v. National Park Bank,39 it was held

that in order to absolve the collecting bank from liability to the drawee
26

Ibid.
N.Y.S. 752 (Sup. Ct. 1895); af' 154 N.Y. 769, 49 N.E. 1101 (1897).
1Id.at 754.
39 13 N.Y.S. 411 (Sup. Ct. 1891); affirmed in 129 N.Y. 647, 29 N.E. 1028
3735
3

(1891).
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on an altered check the agent must have actually parted with the
money and have paid over the proceeds to its principal. In this
case there had been no transfer of funds but credit had been given
and the credit had never been drawn against. The drawee was permitted recovery.
THE RIGHTS OF THE DRAWEE UNDER THE NIL
Section 62 of the NIL provides: "The acceptor by accepting the
instrument engages that he will pay it according to the tenor of his
acceptance ...." Because of the language used in this section of
the NIL the question immediately presented is: Whether a bank
which certified a check which had been altered is liable to the holder
of the certified check according to the original tenor of the instrument or for the amount of the instrument as altered, and secondly
whether payment, as to instruments not previously accepted, is in
fact an acceptance of the instrument within the meaning of the term
as used in this section?
Dean James Bar Ames stated in the Harvard Law Review:
"Since an acceptor, by section 62, engages to pay the bill
'according to the tenor of his acceptance,' he must pay to the
innocent payee or subsequent holder the amount called for by
the bill at the time he accepted, even though larger than the
original amount ordered by the drawer. .

.

. If the acceptor

or certifying bank must honor his acceptance or certification
in such a case, a fortiori a drawee who pays a raised bill or
check, without acceptance or certification should not recover
the money paid from an innocent holder."4
Thus it may be seen that Dean Ames was of the opinion that the
doctrine of Price v. Neal was by section sixty-two of the NIL made
applicable to instruments which had been altered after execution
and that the drawee who paid an innocent holder of an altered
instrument would not be entitled to recover back the sum paid on
the instrument as was permitted at common law.
In Interstate Trust Co. v. United States Nat'l Bank4 the Colorado

court was concerned principally with whether an indorsement "Pay
to the order of any bank or banker-previous indorsements guaranteed" was or was not a restrictive indorsement. The court did cite
40
Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law, 14 Hnv. L. REv. 241, 242
(1900).
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with approval the case of Espy v. First Nat'l Bank42 and Bank of
Commerce v. Union Bank43 to the effect that the drawee who pays
an altered check may recover back the sum paid. In the Interstate
Trust Co. case the payee's name had been altered. The bank could
not rightfully debit the account of the drawer, for the drawee had
not paid the instrument in accordance with the drawer's order. The
drawee could rightfully recover the sum paid from the party to whom
the bank had made payment. Part of the language used in this
case by the Colorado court was subsequently overruled by the
Colorado court in 1954 in the case of American Nat'l Bank v. First
Nat'l Bank." The portion of the opinion which the court disavowed
would not in any way affect the result of the prior case.
The Supreme Court of Missouri in the case of McClendon v. Bank
of Advance,4" which was decided after the NIL had been adopted
in Missouri, reversed the decision of the lower court without comment as to the effect of the NIL in respect to the rights of the drawee
who has paid checks which have been forged as to drawer's signature
or altered. The court, in reversing and remanding, stated that the
payment had been made as the result of a mistake. The drawee
proceeded on the theory the money had been paid under mistake
of fact. The court did not consider any question of liability on the
theory of breach of warranty.
Five years after the decision in the McClendon case the Missouri
Appellate Court was faced again with the same basic problem in the
case of Central Nat'l Bank v. F. W. Drosten Jewelry Co.46 The facts
in the latter case disclosed that the check had been altered as to
payee and amount prior to its use by the holder to purchase a
cashier's check, after first inquiring of the drawee-bank if the check
was good. The Appellate Court reversed the lower court and allowed
plaintiff-drawee to recover the sum which had been paid on the
check. The court also stated that the complaining party could
recover without having returned the check, or having made demand
for payment by defendant prior to the institution of the suit.
In at least three cases from three different jurisdictions decided
after the adoption of the NIL it has been held that the drawee who
67 Colo. 6, 185 Pac. 260 (1919).
4285 U.S. (18 Wall.) 947 (1874).
43 3 N.Y. 230 (1850).
44130 Colo. 557, 277 P.2d 951 (1954).
45 188 Mo. App. 417, 174 S.W. 203 (1915).
46203 Mo. App. 646, 220 S.W. 511 (1920).
41
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had paid an altered bill could not recover back the money paid.
In National City Bank v. Nat'l Bank, " the drawee paid the possession
of a check which had been stolen from the mails by Manning who
erased the payee's name and inserted his own name. Manning tendered the check to a jeweler in payment of merchandise, and the
bank, having certified the check, the merchandise was delivered to
him. Upon discovering the alteration the drawee sought to recover
the amount paid. The appellate court reversed the lower court and
denied to the drawee the right to recover the sum paid on the
altered instrument. The court noted that the defendant had taken
the instrument in good faith, for value with no notice of any
infirmity in the instrument or defect of title of the person negotiating,
and was therefore a holder in due course. The court stated: ".
Section 62 is in accordance with that sound principle which declares
that where one of two innocent parties must suffer a loss the law
will leave the loss where it finds it."48 The court did recognize that
in two cases decided in the same jurisdiction prior to the adoption of
the NIL, the drawee-payor had been permitted to recover back money
paid on the theory that the money had been paid by the draweepayor under mistake of fact and that FirstNat'l Bank v. Northwestern
Nat'l Bank,4" in so far as the principles announced in these decisions
were in conflict with the NIL they were overruled. In both of these
older cases the court specifically held that the acceptor of the
draft did not warrant the genuineness of the body of a draft either
as to the payee or as to amount.
Twenty years after the decision in the National City Bank case the
California Supreme Court in the case of Wells Fargo Bank & Union
Trust Co. v. Bank of Italy"0 was called upon to determine whether
the drawee bank which had certified and paid a check on which
the payee's name had been previously changed could recover back
the payment which it had made on the altered check. The defendant
qualified as a holder in due course of the check. The sole question
for determination was whether the acceptor is liable as an acceptor
according to the tenor of the instrument as originally drawn or as
to its tenor at the time of acceptance. The court noted that the
majoriy of the decisions at common law permitted a bank which
had certified a check after it had been fraudulently altered, as to
N.E. 832 (1921).
'1d. at 108, 132 N.E. 833.
49 152 IM.296, 38 N.E. 736 (1894).
90214 Cal. 156, 4 P.2d. 781 (1931).
47
4 300 IM. 103, 132
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the amount or the name of the payee, and afterwards paid, all other
things being equal, to recover back even against one who had been
a bona fide purchaser. 5 The same rule was followed in New York
in National Reserve Bank v. Corn Exchange Bank 2 after the NIL.
The California Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower
court and denied to the drawee accepting bank the right to recover
back the sum paid on the altered check. The presentation of a check
and the surrender of possession of a check to the drawee for payment
is not a negotiation of the instrument within the meaning of the term
as used in the NIL, therefore the recipient of payment is not liable
as a warrantor under section 66 of the NIL. The drawee who pays
a bill or check does not become a holder in due course of the instrument under section 52 of the NIL, nor even a holder of the instrument
by the terms of section 191 of the NIL. The drawee that pays a bill
or check is not recognized as a transferee of the title to the instrument because by drawee's payment the drawee converts what was
formerly a check or bill into a voucher.53 At common law the
liability on the part of the party receiving payment on an instrument
which had been altered rested upon his quasi contractual duty to
return money received under mistake of fact and not upon any
theory of breach of warranty. The section to recover would not
be found upon the instrument itself for it had been paid. The conclusion of this case is in harmony with the law of England and
continental countries.5"
The most recent important case involving the effect of section 62
of the NIL as to instruments which had been altered is Kansas
Banker's Surety Co. v. Ford County State Bank,55 decided by the
Supreme Court of Kansas in 1959. In this case the action was by
the insurer-subrogee of the drawee-payor bank which had paid an
-" Espy v. First Nat'l Bank, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 947 (1874); Metropolitan
Nat'l Bank, 182 IlM. 367, 55 N.E. 360 (1899); Park v. Roser, 67 Ind. 500
(1879); Bank of Commerce v. Union Bank, 3 N.Y. 230 (1850); Marine Nat'l
Bank v. National City Bank, 59 N.Y. 67 (1874); White v. Continental Nat'l
Bank, 64 N.Y. 316 (1876); City Bank v. First Natl Bank, 45 Tex. 203 (1876).
52 157 N.Y.S. 316 (App. Div. 1916).
53 See: American Hominy Co. v. Milliken Natl Bank, 273 Fed. 550 (S.D.
11. 1920); South Boston Trust Co. v. Levine, 249 Mass. 45, 143 N.E. 816, 817
(1924); National Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 141 Mo. App. 719, 125 S.W. 513
(1910); Woodward v. Savings & Trust Co., 178 N.C. 184 100 S.E. 304
(1919); Figuers v. Fly, 137 Tenn. 358, 193 S.W. 117 (19175; Commerce v.
Seattle
54 Nat'l Bank, 109 Wash. 312, 187 Pac. 342 (1920).
Langton v. Lazarus, 5 Messon & Welsby 628, 151 Eng. Rep. 266 (Ex.
1839); Ames, The Negotiable Instrument Law, 14 HAv. L. REv. 241, 243
(1900); 1 PAnnissus, Couns DE Dnorr Co~Nvnmcr. 545 (6th ed. 1856).
5- 184 Kan. 529,338 P.2d 309 (1959).
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altered check. The defendant was treated by the court as having
been a holder in due course of the check. The issue in this case
was clearly set forth in the following unambiguous terms: "The
sole question presented is whether the drawee bank is liable on its
payment to the indorsee bank according to the tenor of the instrument as originally drawn or according to the tenor of the instrument
at the time of its payment." The check in question as originally
drawn by D. W. Burnet was dated November 20, 1955, in the amount
of $90.20 payable to the order of Clarence Windle. After receipt of
the check, Windle, without authority to do so, changed the date of
the check to December 9, 1955, and raised the amount to 14,000
dollars. Windle thereafter placed his name on the reverse side of
the check and delivered it to the defendant. The defendant indorsed
the check with an unqualified indorsement and sent it through the
usual banking channels to the drawee bank for payment. After the
alteration had been discovered the plaintiff notified the defendant
that the defendant "by its indorsement on said check, warranted
said instrument to be genuine, when and as it was a spurious instrument and of no validity." It is not clear that the plaintiff in this
case sought recovery from the defendant on the theory that the
defendant was liable for breach of warranty or sought recovery on
the theory that the payment had been made under a mistake of fact.
The court denied the plaintiff's claim.
Attention is called to the language of section 62 of the NIL which
sets forth the liability of an acceptor of a bill. Section sixty-two
provided in part that the acceptor "engages that he will pay it
according to the tenor of his acceptance ... ." While it is recognized

that the instruments involved in both the Illinois and California
cases had been certified prior to payment it is thought by this
writer that the same result would have been reached by each of these
courts if there had been payment without the prior certification.
The Kansas case is of particular interest because the Kansas court
in effect held payment to be an acceptance and therefore covered
by section sixty-two of the NIL. Judge Schroeder, speaking for the
Kansas court stated:
"The tenor of the acceptance is determined by the instrument
as it is when the drawee pays and that is a bill for the raised
amount. That is the bill he accepted and no other, and according to its tenor he has engaged that he will pay it. Converted
to the facts in the instant case a check is defined as a bill of
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exchange, payable on demand, and actual payment by the
drawee is greater than an acceptance
by the drawee what is
56
merely a promise in writing to pay.9
This statement is of considerable importance because it is considering payment to be an acceptance and within the purview of section
62. There should be no question but what payment is a form of
acceptance and that section sixty-two should apply to payment
by the drawee in instances where it would be applicable in the form
of an obligation to pay. "The payment of a check includes its
acceptance." 5 It is noted that in both the Illinois and California cases
the drawee-payor had accepted the check prior to actually paying it.
While in the Nebraska case the drawee had merely paid the altered
check.
Returning to the issue of whether one who indorses an instrument
may be held liable for breach of warranty consideration must be
given to the effect of sections 66, 52, 191 and 30 of the NIL.
Section 66 provides "Every indorser without qualification warrants
to all subsequent holders in due course: (1) The matters and
things mentioned in subdivisions 1, 2 and 3 of the next preceding
section. . .

."

Subdivision one of the preceding section stated that

an indorser warrants: "That the instrument is genuine and in all
respects what it purports to be." Clearly if the instrument had
been raised it is not genuine and what it purports to be. Section
fifty-two defines a holder in due course as "a holder who has taken
the instrument under the following conditions: . . ." Next, looking

to section 191 we find a holder defined as follows: "'Holder' means
the payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it,
or the bearer thereof." According to section thirty "an instrument
is negotiated when it is transferred from one person to another in
such manner as to constitute the transferee the holder thereof. ..."
Reading these four sections together it would follow that the draweepayor cannot hold an indorser liable for breach of any warranty
as the indorser's liability does not extend to the drawee. Warranties
arise where there is a sale of an instrument not when the instrument
is merely presented to the drawee for payment. Payment by the
drawee of a bill or check does not mean that the drawee has purchased the bill or check. Payment by the drawee extinguishes the
56

57

Id.at 534, 338 P.2d at 313.
1d. at 534, 338 P.2d at 313. See also Louisa Nat'l Bank v. Kentucky

Nat'l Bank, 239 Ky. 302, 39 S.W.2d 497 (1931); BaNAN, NEcOTALE
INsmhumEms § 62, 917-18 (7th ed. 1948).
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instrument, it cannot be put into circulation again so as to bind the
drawer or prior indorsers. The Supreme Court of Kansas cited
with approval the excellent statement by the Oregon Supreme Court
in First Nat'l Bank v. United States Nat'l Bank:"
"Manifestly, presentment to the drawee for payment is not
a negotiation of a check; for payment transmits the paper
from a negotiable instrument into a mere canceled voucher.
When paid the check has run its course as a negotiable instrument.... It is manifest that the drawee, who pays a check and
then receives it as a cancelled voucher divested of its character
as a negotiable instrument, is not 'a holder' within the meaning
of that term as it is used in negotiable instrument law. It
follows, therefore, that the negotiable instruments law did not
write into the indorsement of the defendant any of the warranties proscribed by [sections 65 and 66 of the NIL]. .. .
The Kansas court was of the opinion that the plaintiff had no right
to recover from the party receiving payment on the theory of breach
of warranty. The court determined that the statutory warranties
under the NIL are exclusive and preclude all inferences of implied
warranties.
The court by the way of dicta suggested that section 62 makes
no exception to cases where the party who received payment had
been negligent or had acted in bad faith. The court did observe
that courts had generally recognized that negligence and bad faith
on the part of the holder was to be treated differently than in the
cases where he had not been negligent nor had acted in bad faith.
The courts recognized that as section 62 of the NIL was a codification of the doctrine of Price v. Neal, it likewise included the limitations which attached to the doctrine of Price v. Neal. That is to
say, section sixty-two of the NIL is to be extended to matters not
included in the doctrine of Price v. Neal but is subject to the limitations to the doctrine which the courts have previously recognized.
RECOVERY FROM COLLECTING BANK UNDER NIL
In at least three cases decided subsequent to the adoption of the
NIL the courts have uniformly denied to the drawee plaintiff the
right to recover from the drawee funds on an altered check where
the agent had made settlement with his principal prior to being
18 100 Ore. 264, 197 Pao. 547 (1921).
59 184 Kan. 529, 536, 338 P.2d 309, 315 (1959).
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notified of the alteration. In 1958 the New York court in Seaboard
Surety Co. v. First Nat'l City Bank6" the drawee had been put on
notice that the party to whom payment had been made by the
restrictive character of the indorsement, "received for collection."
The court found for the defendant because the restrictive indorsee
who had received payment had settled with the restrictive indorser
prior to learning of the alteration of the instrument. The court did
enter a verdict against the restrictive indorser for the difference
between the original tenor of the instrument and the altered amount.
It seems that the court permitted the recovery on the theory of
breach of warranty, but from the language used by the court this
is not altogether clear.
While the opinion in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Corpus
Christi Nat'l Bank" leaves something to be desired for clarity in
respect to when the plaintiff-drawee bank that had paid the altered
check just learned that the defendant collecting-bank was in fact
only a collecting agent. The position of the court is summarized
in the following portion of the opinion:
"At the time the collection bank called up the drawee bank
and asked whether or not the check had been paid, it had
not at that time paid the proceeds of the raised check to its
depositor. The fact that the collecting bank had given a bookkeeping credit for such check is immaterial because up until
the proceeds of the check had actually been paid to the depositor
(no rights of innocent third person having intervened), the
amount of the check could have been charged back to the
account of the depositor and there would have been no loss....
Under such circumstances it would be inequitable to permit
the drawee bank, or any one standing in its position, to recover
from the innocent collecting bank. 62
The dictum in Citizens' Bank v. Commercial Savings Bank6' decision
of 1923 is in accord with the two previously considered cases.
DRAWEE's RIGHTS UNDER THE UCC
Section 3-417 of the Uniform Commercial Code, hereafter re-

ferred to as the UCC, deals with warranties on presentment and
transfer and provides in part:
60

180 N.Y.S.2d 156 (New York City City Ct. 1958).

186 S.W.2d 840 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
62 Id. at 841.
63209 Ala. 280, 96 So. 324 (1923).
61
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"(1) Any person who obtains payment or acceptance at
any prior transferor warrants to a person who in good faith
pays or accepts that . . . (c) the instrument has not been

materially altered, except that his warranty is not given by
a holder in due course acting in good faith . . . (iii) to the

acceptor of a draft with respect to an alteration made prior
to the acceptance if the holder in due course took the draft
after the acceptance, even though the acceptance provided
'payable as originally drawn' or equivalent terms; or (iv) to
the acceptor of a draft with respect to an alteration made after
the acceptance....
"(4) A selling agent or broker who does not disclose the
fact that he is acting only as such give the warranties provided
in this section, but if he makes such disclosure warrants only
his good faith and authority."
In the cases decided before the UCC, the drawee who had paid an
altered instrument was permitted to recover the difference between
the original tenor and altered tenor of the bill from the party who
received payment from the drawee-payor. The author has been
unable to locate any case inwhich the drawee-payor was permitted to
recover from one who had indorsed subsequent to the alteration and
who was not the recipient of payment. It would seem that the fact
that a check had been certified subsequent to its alteration and prior
to payment should not be treated differently in respect to the draweepayor's rights than if the drawee-payor had merely paid the instrument after it had been altered. In those jurisdictions in which the
acceptor or certifying bank in the case of a check is held liable on
the bill or check according to the tenor of the instrument at the time
of acceptance or certification, as in Illinois or California, the acceptor
or certifying bank would not be allowed to avoid its acceptance as
against the good faith holder for value of a bill or check because of
its mistake in accepting or certifying the altered bill or check. The
fact that the acceptor had followed his acceptance by paying the
instrument would in such jurisdiction prohibit the acceptor from
recovering the sum paid on any portion of the payment from an
innocent recipient. The acceptor or certifying bank would be denied
the right to raise the issue of money paid under mistake of fact. It
would be highly illogical to permit the acceptor or certifying bank
to recover any portion of the sum paid on such altered instrument
and then to permit the holder to recover against the acceptor or the
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certifying bank in accordance with the altered tenor of the bill or
check. In those jurisdictions in which the acceptor or certifying
bank is only liable as an acceptor according to the original tenor
of the instrument, logic would dictate that the drawee-payor, upon
payment of the bill according to the altered tenor of the bill, could
recover back the difference between the original and altered tenor
of the instrument. If we were to treat the payment by the draweepayor as a form of acceptance it would seem to follow that in
jurisdictions adhering to the Illinois-California concept the draweepayor would not be entitled to recover from an innocent party who
received payment the difference between the original tenor and the
altered tenor of the instrument.
It appears that section 3-417 of the UCC affords to one who has
accepted or paid an altered bill, rights and remedies not previously
possessed by such drawee-payor.
It is noted that section 3-417 of the UCC starts off in the following
language: "Any person who obtains payment or acceptance at
any prior transferor warrants to a person who in good faith pays
or accepts. . .

."

In view of the language used it would seem that

one who received payment of a bill or one who acquired the drawee's
acceptance, which would include certification, warrants that the instrument had not been previously altered. This section would afford
to the drawee who paid an altered check the right to proceed against
the person to whom payment had been made on the theory of breach
of warranty. The right to proceed by the way of breach of warranty
should not be construed as divesting the one paying the altered
instrument of his right to recover back the difference between the
original tenor and the altered tenor of the bill or check on the
theory of money paid under mistake of fact. Prior to the UCC the
recovery in such event was usually based on the theory of money
paid under mistake of fact. It would seem that the measure of
recovery should be the same irrespective of which theory the one
paying the instrument might use. However, the statute of limitations
might be different depending on the theory of the action. In those
jurisdictions where there is a shorter statute of limitations on actions
based on implied contracts than on written contracts the draweepayor might have a longer period in which to institute his action
if he proceeded by the way of an action for breach of warranty. For
example, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has held that
one who merely indorses a negotiable instrument is subject to the
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statute of limitations applicable to written contracts because the
indorsement is but an abbreviated form of a written contract. 4
As the warranty under this subsection is made by any prior transferor to the one accepting or paying the instrument, the draweepayor has the right to proceed, by the way of an action for breach
of warranty, against one who had previously transferred the altered
instrument by delivery alone. Such transferor would be liable to
the drawee-payor who paid the bill according to its altered tenor,
and to his immediate transferee for breach of warranty as provided
in subsection (2) of section 3-417, but not to those through whose
hands it passed between his immediate transferee and the party who
received payment of the altered bill or acceptance of the instrument.
Subsection (2) provides: "Any person who transfers an instrument
and receives consideration warrants to his transferee and if the
transferor is by indorsement to any subsequent holder who takes the
instrument in good faith that . . . (c) the instrument had not been
materially altered. . . ." Under subsection (2) the one paying the

instrument would not be the transferee of the one who had previously
transferred the instrument, nor would the one paying the instrument
qualify as a holder.
By the exceptions set forth in section 3-417(c) (iii) (iv) the warranty that the instrument had not been previously altered is not
made by a holder in due course in respect to alteration occurring
prior to an acceptance of the instrument when the holder in due
course acquired the instrument after the acceptance, even though
the acceptance contained such language as "payable as originally
drawn." Nor would a holder in due course be charged with breach
of warranty in respect to a material alteration where the instrument
had been altered subsequent to the acceptance of the bill but prior
to the time the accepted bill was paid.
It would seem that every transferor of a negotiable bill of exchange or check, whether by indorsement and delivery or by delivery
alone, who was not a holder in due course of the instrument subsequent to the alteration would be liable for breach of warranty to
the drawee-payor who paid an altered bill or check, whether or not
the drawee-payor had previously accepted the bill or check. If the
bill had not previously been accepted, the party receiving payment,
64Houston

v. Lawhead, 116 W. Va. 652, 182 S.E. 780 (1935).
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or a prior transferor, whether he transferred the instrument by
indorsement and delivery, or by delivery alone, would be liable on
the theory of breach of warranty to the drawee-payor who paid
such altered bill for the difference between the original tenor and
the altered tenor of the bill.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol66/iss4/3

22

